# MoveGPT

# **Audit Report**





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## MoveGPT Audit Report

## **1 Executive Summary**

## 1.1 Project Information

| Description | The First Al Launchpad built on the Aptos Chain, powering the Move Web3 Economy                    |
|-------------|--|
| Туре        | Launchpad  |
| Auditors    | MoveBit  |
| Timeline    | Sat Apr 06 2024 - Thu Apr 11 2024  |
| Languages   | Move   |
| Platform    | Aptos  |
| Methods     | Architecture Review, Unit Testing, Manual Review   |
| Source Code | https://github.com/ken-movegpt/movegpt-contract  |
| Commits     | <u>4340dcd18e811aa8f152f89f037054cca902f1ef</u><br><u>d9119649c70ff6d9bcc5c2f2495ef60022ee10cc</u> |

## 1.2 Files in Scope

The following are the SHA1 hashes of the original reviewed files.

| ID   | File                                      | SHA-1 Hash                                   |
|------|---|--|
| VES  | sources/vesting.move                      | 2078b7b5bc9c5777ca668b3b2958<br>eaf4ee078414 |
| BUY  | sources/buy.move                          | 199a2e0239530e46605a9b08636a<br>8dcb7803e5e6 |
| МТО  | sources/movegpt_token.move                | a9431d0c5fb38bf849381fe16a4f0c<br>ac340d8185 |
| TCS  | sources/tests/test_claim_sale.move        | d4a0c9bcfbc6b878647b2b737375<br>d34982201524 |
| TVE  | sources/tests/test_voting_escrow.<br>move | a5383a3fa045f44a8c4be9d41aa99<br>92477c47e2f |
| TBU  | sources/tests/test_buy.move               | f343c661ae8e3fc7130a99aeadc45<br>121f5a4dd1c |
| TVE1 | sources/tests/test_vesting.move           | 1dcebb4ca73a83315183c81985a0<br>76f04abbcf0f |
| THE  | sources/tests/test_helper.move            | 9e49eb535567d94f98f85b84b544b<br>5a8f3ea14b8 |
| TTO  | sources/tests/test_token.move             | 1a83791007d9a8a63c0e2e4ce90f8<br>66059ea5804 |
| TAI  | sources/tests/test_airdrop.move           | 2c933b0515d1c3edccfcaa406af15<br>8001e46a2e2 |
| EPO  | sources/epoch.move                        | dadf8510c62d6a089520746c097b<br>2d04fc31ebc9 |
|      |   |  |

| AIR  | sources/airdrop.move         | 07f461837fb7f64e94379570957b7<br>d9c257bc52c |
|------|------------------------------|--|
| VES1 | sources/voting_escrow.move   | 8e8331016bddb9526eaf529b216b<br>c19c338af90c |
| CSA  | sources/claim_sale.move      | 80f8c4ee29d915879ee387d881231<br>a93cdb2432a |
| PMA  | sources/package_manager.move | 01dc1a80aa995cc843a565fcdb453<br>44c7d228b0a |

## 1.3 Issue Statistic

| ltem          | Count | Fixed | Acknowledged |
|---------------|-------|-------|--------------|
| Total         | 10    | 10    | 0            |
| Informational | 0     | 0     | 0            |
| Minor         | 3     | 3     | 0            |
| Medium        | 6     | 6     | 0            |
| Major         | 1     | 1     | 0            |
| Critical      | 0     | 0     | 0            |

#### 1.4 MoveBit Audit Breakdown

MoveBit aims to assess repositories for security-related issues, code quality, and compliance with specifications and best practices. Possible issues our team looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Transaction-ordering dependence
- Timestamp dependence
- Integer overflow/underflow by bit operations
- Number of rounding errors
- Denial of service / logical oversights
- Access control
- Centralization of power
- Business logic contradicting the specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication
- Gas usage
- Arbitrary token minting
- Unchecked CALL Return Values
- The flow of capability
- Witness Type

### 1.5 Methodology

The security team adopted the "Testing and Automated Analysis", "Code Review" and "Formal Verification" strategy to perform a complete security test on the code in a way that is closest to the real attack. The main entrance and scope of security testing are stated in the conventions in the "Audit Objective", which can expand to contexts beyond the scope according to the actual testing needs. The main types of this security audit include:

#### (1) Testing and Automated Analysis

Items to check: state consistency / failure rollback / unit testing / value overflows / parameter verification / unhandled errors / boundary checking / coding specifications.

#### (2) Code Review

The code scope is illustrated in section 1.2.

#### (3) Formal Verification

Perform formal verification for key functions with the Move Prover.

#### (4) Audit Process

- Carry out relevant security tests on the testnet or the mainnet;
- If there are any questions during the audit process, communicate with the code owner
  in time. The code owners should actively cooperate (this might include providing the
  latest stable source code, relevant deployment scripts or methods, transaction
  signature scripts, exchange docking schemes, etc.);
- The necessary information during the audit process will be well documented for both the audit team and the code owner in a timely manner.

## 2 Summary

This report has been commissioned by MoveGPT to identify any potential issues and vulnerabilities in the source code of the MoveGPT smart contract, as well as any contract dependencies that were not part of an officially recognized library. In this audit, we have utilized various techniques, including manual code review and static analysis, to identify potential vulnerabilities and security issues.

During the audit, we identified 10 issues of varying severity, listed below.

| ID    | Title   | Severity | Status |
|-------|---|----------|--------|
| BUY-1 | nonce Always Be 0                                     | Medium   | Fixed  |
| BUY-2 | Initialize Function Lacks Privilege Control           | Medium   | Fixed  |
| CSA-1 | refund_entry Function Can Be<br>Called Multiple Times | Major    | Fixed  |
| CSA-2 | Some View Function Logic Errors                       | Medium   | Fixed  |
| CSA-3 | claim Function Can Be Called<br>Multiple Times        | Medium   | Fixed  |
| CSA-4 | claim Function May Cause DOS<br>Problems              | Medium   | Fixed  |
| CSA-5 | Unnecessary Boolean Comparison                        | Minor    | Fixed  |
| CSA-6 | Lack of Events Emit                                   | Minor    | Fixed  |
| VES-1 | Logic Error in Claim Function                         | Medium   | Fixed  |
| VES-2 | Code Optimization                                     | Minor    | Fixed  |

## **3 Participant Process**

Here are the relevant actors with their respective abilities within the MoveGPT Smart Contract :

#### Admin

- Admin can set vesting-related settings via the set\* function.
- Admin can get lock coin by using the claim\_entry function.
- Admin can add private or ido claimer by using the add\_private\_claimers or add\_ido\_claimers function.

#### User

- Users can get airdrop nft by using the airdrop\_entry function.
- Users can refund their allocation by using the refund\_ido\_entry function.
- Users can claim their ido or private by using the claim\_private\_entry or claim\_ido\_entry .

#### Governance

- Governace can update the operator through update\_operator().
- Governace can update the governace through update\_governance() .
- Governace can upgrade the module through upgrade().

## 4 Findings

## BUY-1 nonce Always Be 0

Severity: Medium

Status: Fixed

#### Code Location:

sources/buy.move#135

#### Descriptions:

The nonce string value added to the signature in the buy function is always 0 and there is no place to change it.

#### Suggestion:

It is recommended not to use hard-coded.

#### Resolution:

## BUY-2 Initialize Function Lacks Privilege Control

Severity: Medium

Status: Fixed

Code Location:

sources/buy.move#53

#### Descriptions:

The initialize function can be called by any user and passed any parameter.

#### Suggestion:

It is recommended to add privilege control to the initialize function.

#### Resolution:

This issue has been fixed. The client added privilege control to the function.

### CSA-1 refund\_entry Function Can Be Called Multiple Times

Severity: Major

Status: Fixed

#### Code Location:

sources/claim\_sale.move#247 346

#### Descriptions:

The refund\_entry function did not update the user's status after the user was refunded resulting in the user being able to call refund\_entry multiple times and reduce the value of total\_bought at will. Also the withdraw\_round function operator can be called multiple times.

#### Suggestion:

It is recommended to update the user's status after the call.

#### Resolution:

This issue has been fixed. The client modified the logic of the refund\_entry function.

## CSA-2 Some View Function Logic Errors

Severity: Medium

Status: Fixed

#### Code Location:

sources/claim\_sale.move#101-106

#### Descriptions:

The view function to get information about private\_round is still retrieved from the ido\_round field.

#### Suggestion:

It is recommended that this be modified to the correct logic based on the design.

#### Resolution:

## CSA-3 claim Function Can Be Called Multiple Times

Severity: Medium

Status: Fixed

#### Code Location:

sources/claim\_sale.move#298

#### Descriptions:

claim related functions can be called multiple times by the user, it is recommended to confirm whether this design conforms to the design concept.

#### Suggestion:

It is recommended to determine the state of the user before calling it.

#### Resolution:

### CSA-4 claim Function May Cause DOS Problems

Severity: Medium

Status: Fixed

#### Code Location:

sources/claim\_sale.move#294

#### Descriptions:

In the claim function, when lock\_amount is equal to round\_config.balances, it will extract all the coins in round\_config.balances, but by calculating the lock\_amount may be less than round\_config.balances, then the function will always fail when reaching the else branch to extract the lock\_amount from balances.

#### Suggestion:

It suggests modifying the conditions to avoid dos problems.

#### Resolution:

This issue has been fixed. The client modified the logic for the lock\_amount judgment.

## CSA-5 Unnecessary Boolean Comparison

Severity: Minor

Status: Fixed

#### Code Location:

sources/claim\_sale.move#303;

sources/buy.move#125

#### **Descriptions:**

There are statements in the contract that use Boolean variables to compare with Boolean values, such as order\_is\_exist(order\_id,buy\_orders) == false, and it is recommended to just use that field's value directly.

#### Suggestion:

It is recommended to fix them.

#### Resolution:

### CSA-6 Lack of Events Emit

Severity: Minor

Status: Fixed

#### Code Location:

sources/claim\_sale.move#155-230

#### Descriptions:

The smart contract lacks appropriate events for monitoring sensitive operations, which could make it difficult to track sensitive actions or detect potential issues.

#### Suggestion:

It is recommended to emit events for those important functions.

#### Resolution:

### VES-1 Logic Error in Claim Function

Severity: Medium

Status: Fixed

#### Code Location:

sources/vesting.move#313

#### Descriptions:

The assertion function current\_time > vesting\_config.start causes the claim function to never reach the if branch of the vesting\_config.start > current\_time condition.

#### Suggestion:

It is recommended to ensure that the function conforms to the design.

#### Resolution:

This issue has been fixed. The client modified the logic of the claim function.

## VES-2 Code Optimization

Severity: Minor

Status: Fixed

#### Code Location:

sources/vesting.move#142-229

#### Descriptions:

There is a lot of duplicate code in the set\* function associated with setting global variables, such as vesting\_config.start = new\_start\_time or vesting\_config.vesting\_duration = new\_duration\_time, and the same code can be extracted to make the code more readable.

#### Suggestion:

It is recommended to fix them.

#### Resolution:

## Appendix 1

#### Issue Level

- **Informational** issues are often recommendations to improve the style of the code or to optimize code that does not affect the overall functionality.
- **Minor** issues are general suggestions relevant to best practices and readability. They don't post any direct risk. Developers are encouraged to fix them.
- **Medium** issues are non-exploitable problems and not security vulnerabilities. They should be fixed unless there is a specific reason not to.
- **Major** issues are security vulnerabilities. They put a portion of users' sensitive information at risk, and often are not directly exploitable. All major issues should be fixed.
- **Critical** issues are directly exploitable security vulnerabilities. They put users' sensitive information at risk. All critical issues should be fixed.

#### **Issue Status**

- **Fixed:** The issue has been resolved.
- Partially Fixed: The issue has been partially resolved.
- Acknowledged: The issue has been acknowledged by the code owner, and the code owner confirms it's as designed, and decides to keep it.

## Appendix 2

#### Disclaimer

This report is based on the scope of materials and documents provided, with a limited review at the time provided. Results may not be complete and do not include all vulnerabilities. The review and this report are provided on an as-is, where-is, and as-available basis. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any associated services, products, protocols, platforms, content, and materials, will be at your own risk. A report does not imply an endorsement of any particular project or team, nor does it guarantee its security. These reports should not be relied upon in any way by any third party, including for the purpose of making any decision to buy or sell products, services, or any other assets. TO THE FULLEST EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW, WE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, IN CONNECTION WITH THIS REPORT, ITS CONTENT, RELATED SERVICES AND PRODUCTS, AND YOUR USE, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, NOT INFRINGEMENT.

